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How Should We Treat the Vulnerable? Qualitative 
Study of Authoritative Ethics Documents
Ivana Zagorac, PhD
Abstract: The aim of this study is to explore what actual guidance is provided by authori-
tative ethics documents regarding the recognition and protection of the vulnerable. The 
documents included in this analysis are the Belmont Report, the Declaration of Helsinki, 
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) Guidelines, and 
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, including its supple-
mentary report on vulnerability. A qualitative analysis of these documents was conducted 
in light of three questions: what is vulnerability, who are the vulnerable, and how should 
the vulnerable be protected? The results show significant differences among the documents 
regarding the first two questions. None of the documents provides any guidance on the third 
question (how to protect the vulnerable). These results suggest a great discrepancy between 
the acknowledged importance of the concept of vulnerability and a general understanding 
of the scope, content, and practical implications of vulnerability. 
Key words: Vulnerability, vulnerable populations, guideline, human research subject 
protection.
The concept of vulnerability has achieved prominence in national and international medical research and health care ethical conduct guidelines. The conventional 
understanding considers vulnerability being “exposed to the possibility of being attacked 
or harmed, either physically or emotionally” (Latin, vulnerare, to wound).1 Normative 
projects (declarations, conventions, laws, professional codices) typically involve a call 
for minimizing vulnerability and protecting the vulnerable. Thus, it is to be expected 
that high- profile ethics documents take an interest both in framing the concept itself 
and in providing general instructions on how to deal with situations in which subjects 
are considered vulnerable. When dealing with the topic of vulnerability in the field of 
(bio)medicine, many authors refer to such authoritative documents,2–6 and yet system-
atic analysis is rare.7 Both scholars and policymakers have an interest in defining the 
criteria for recognizing vulnerable subjects and introducing measures for their protec-
tion. While many valuable efforts have been made to this end, the surprising outcome 
is that of a non- unified, and hence weak, account of the problem.
Some authors have suggested that the concept of vulnerability should be rejected 
entirely because it has become “too nebulous to be meaningful”8[p. 46] after being applied 
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to different subjects under very different circumstances and in mutually incomparable 
contexts.9 While we avoid this conclusion, we agree with the identification of the 
problem. This paper uses a selection of authoritative ethics documents to highlight 
sources of disagreement and the different approaches used in understanding the 
nature of vulnerability, as well as to assess their sustainability. The aim of the paper 
is twofold: to explore how selected documents respond to the suggested ambiguity of 
vulnerability, and thus show their strength in providing guidance in questions related 
to the treatment of the vulnerable. 
Methods 
We have conducted an in- depth analysis of the Belmont Report,10 the Declaration of 
Helsinki (its 2000, 2008, and 2013 versions),11 CIOMS Guidelines (in all versions where 
vulnerability was mentioned),12–14 and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights,15 including its report The Principle of Respect for Human Vulner-
ability and Personal Integrity.16 This analysis was conducted in light of three research 
questions: (1) What is vulnerability? (2) Who are the vulnerable? (3) How should the 
vulnerable be protected? 
Selection criteria and rationale. The documents examined here were selected on 
several grounds. (1) They share the same goal: all of them wish to provide ethical guid-
ance for (bio)medical research involving human subjects, while the UNESCO Declara-
tion expands this goal to the provision of guidance in issues regarding human rights 
and bioethics. (2) They address issues of vulnerability: in most of them, vulnerability is 
one of the most important topics, while the IBC Report on Article 8 of the UNESCO 
Declaration deals exclusively with vulnerability. (3) They share the same methodology, 
from defining general principles to providing more or less detailed comments on the 
applications of these principles. (4) They also share a strong institutional background; 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, the World Medical Association, the World Health Organization, 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (5) They 
are highly influential: publications of these documents and each revision that some 
of them have undergone have been noticed by both the professional community and 
the public at large, and have been discussed intensively. All of the selected documents 
are highly respected and are often used as supporting material for national legislative 
and professional codices, as well as essential references for institutional review boards.
The Belmont Report. The Belmont Report is one of the leading documents concern-
ing ethics and health care research. By 1979, when the Belmont Report was published, 
several other important ethics documents had already been adopted by many organiza-
tions. The Nuremberg Code (1947) had been known for more than three decades, and 
the Declaration of Helsinki had already undergone its first revision (originally published 
in 1964, revised for the first time in 1975). However, it was the Belmont Report that 
first introduced the notion of vulnerability. 
The Declaration of Helsinki. The Declaration of Helsinki (DoH), developed by the 
World Medical Association (WMA), is “a statement of ethical principles for medical 
research involving human subjects, including research on identifiable human material 
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and data” (Article 1).11[p.  50] The document is addressed primarily to physicians, but 
also encourages others involved in medical research to adopt its principles (Article 
2).11 The DoH was adopted in Helsinki in June of 1964, and its seventh revision was 
completed in October of 2013. During its half- century of existence, the text has become 
longer (the 2013 version is three times longer than the 1964 version) and revisions 
have become more frequent.17 The DoH has been revised three times in the past 15 
years alone, and notes of clarifications have been added on two other occasions. Not 
only has the DoH come to have a great historical impact, but it has also become the 
most influential ethics document guiding the field.11 Vulnerability is first mentioned 
in the fifth revision of the DoH (2000). Our analysis includes this and the subsequent 
two revisions of the DoH. 
The CIOMS Guidelines. The Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS) was jointly established by WHO and UNESCO in 1949. In 2013, 
CIOMS membership included 49 international, national, and associate member orga-
nizations. The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences focuses on 
the field of the biomedical sciences. It issued its Proposed International Ethical Guidelines 
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in conjunction with WHO in 1982. 
In 1993, CIOMS issued the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, which superseded the Proposed Guidelines. The Guidelines 
were revised and updated in 2002, and this version is currently undergoing yet another 
revision. The changes announced are significant (major revisions of several guidelines, 
the merging of a few others, merging the entire document with the CIOMS Guidelines 
for Epidemiological Research). The revision of Guideline 13, which explicitly addresses 
research involving vulnerable populations, has not been announced.12 Our analysis 
includes CIOMS documents that mention vulnerability. 
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. The Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights was unanimously adopted in 2005 by 
all member states of UNESCO. It is implemented in international human rights law, 
although it is not legally binding.7,18–20 It aims at universality, and the resulting text 
was criticized at the time of its publication,21,22 however, the Declaration was adopted 
by many additional countries in the following decade despite this criticism. In 2013, 
UNESCO published The Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal 
Integrity of the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC), the sole purpose 
of which is to reflect on Article 8 of the UNESCO Declaration. With its core text and 
two appendices amounting to 54 pages, the IBC Report is the most thorough examina-
tion of the concept of vulnerability that has yet been conducted by any internationally 
recognized organization. Our analysis includes both the Declaration and the IBC Report. 
Results
The Belmont Report. The Belmont Report10 outlines three basic ethical principles—
respect for persons, beneficence, and justice—and three applications of these principles 
to research conduct. Vulnerable subjects and populations are mentioned under all 
three applications. Concerning informed consent, it is argued that the voluntariness 
of informed consent may be compromised in cases where a research subject is under 
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“undue influence.” The Report further states that research subjects who are under com-
manding or controlling influence are “especially vulnerable.” In the section on risk and 
benefit assessment, the Report argues that the justifiability of research with vulnerable 
populations itself should be demonstrated. The third application of general ethical 
principles deals with the question of selecting research subjects. The Report states 
that the burdens and benefits of research may be unjustly distributed even if research 
subjects are selected and treated fairly. Injustice arises “from social, racial, sexual and 
cultural biases institutionalized in society” (Part C, Section 3)10 which are out of the 
hands of researchers. Nevertheless, researchers should take them into account and 
consider distributive justice in selecting research subjects. Only this section makes 
explicit reference to vulnerable subjects. The Report lists four groups—racial minori-
ties, the economically disadvantaged, the very sick, and the institutionalized—with a 
brief explanation of the substance of their vulnerabilities: members of these groups are 
either in dependent status and their capacity for free consent is frequently compromised, 
or they are easy to manipulate as a result of their illness or socioeconomic condition. 
The Declaration of Helsinki (DoH). Vulnerability is first mentioned in the fifth 
revision of the DoH (adopted by the 52nd WMA General Assembly in Edinburgh, 
October 2000). In the Introduction, the DoH states that “some research populations 
are vulnerable and need special protection” (Article 8).11[p 78] What follows is a list of 
five groups: (1) the economically and medically disadvantaged, (2) those who cannot 
give or refuse consent for themselves, (3) those who may be subject to giving consent 
under duress, (4) those who will not benefit personally from the research, (5) those for 
whom the research is combined with medical care.11[p. 78] The basis upon which these 
groups were formed is unclear, and it is difficult to detect even a familial resemblance 
between them. Nevertheless, the explicit reference to vulnerable populations reflects 
the need for vulnerability to be integrated carefully into medical research planning.
Article 9 of the sixth revision of the DoH (adopted by the 59th WMA General Assembly 
in Seoul, October 2008) addresses “particularly vulnerable research populations.”11[p. 66] 
In this revision, the previous list of five groups is shortened to two: those who cannot 
give or refuse consent for themselves (group 2 from previous version) and those who 
may be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence (group 3). Later articles specify 
members of these groups as those who are incompetent / incapable (2) or those in a 
dependent relationship or under duress (3). In these cases, the DoH asks that informed 
consent be sought indirectly (Articles 27 and 29). Groups (4) and (5) from the 2000 
version are mentioned in other articles of the revised 2008 version. Section C of the 
2008 DoH lists additional principles for medical research combined with medical care, 
thus corresponding with a call for the special protection of group (5) from an earlier 
version of the DoH. The special protection of group (4) is reflected in articles referring 
to the post- study ability of study subjects to access interventions identified as beneficial 
in the study (Articles 14 and 33) and in articles allowing medical research involving a 
“disadvantaged or vulnerable population or community” only if there is a “reasonable 
likelihood” that they will benefit from the research (Article 17).11[p. 67] The former refers 
to personal benefit, while the latter refers to the benefit of the entire population. The 
latter article is simultaneously the only place where the “disadvantaged” (1) are men-
tioned. Moreover, it is suggested that the “disadvantaged” are not “vulnerable” as was 
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stated in an earlier version of the DoH. While this detail might be open to different 
interpretations, the absence of a reference to the lack of economic power or medical 
resources of potential research subjects is evident.
The seventh revision of the DoH (adopted by the 64th WMA General Assembly 
in Fortaleza, October 2013) brought changes mostly regarding the organization of its 
articles (which lent the document a more coherent structure), a change in its overall 
tone (“should” is frequently replaced with “must”), and a change the terminology used: 
the connection between “incompetent / incapable” and informed consent which was 
previously expressed narratively was changed to the more straightforward classifica-
tion of “capable / incapable of giving informed consent.” Alongside these changes, this 
revision responded to heated discussion on some elements of earlier versions that had 
focused mostly on restrictions regarding the use of placebos. This latest revision of the 
DoH also introduced the obligation for appropriate compensation and treatment for 
subjects who were harmed as a result of participating in research (Article 15), which 
represents an important innovation of this newest version. However, the greatest change 
concerned vulnerable groups and individuals (Articles 19 and 20).
“Particularly vulnerable subjects” are now described as those who “may have an 
increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring additional harm” (Article 19).11[p. 51] 
When it comes to medical research with vulnerable groups, the newest revision of the 
DoH adopts restrictions already mentioned in earlier versions: research involving vul-
nerable groups is justified only if it is responsive to the health needs or priorities of the 
group and if the group stands to benefit from the results of the research. However, this 
revision includes an additional restriction: such research is justified only if it cannot be 
carried out among a non- vulnerable group (Article 20). Exclusion criteria such as this 
are not entirely new to the DoH, as this criterion was (and still is) an important part 
of its instructions on research involving subjects incapable of giving informed consent. 
Two out of three restrictions imposed upon medical research involving vulnerable 
groups and research involving individuals incapable of giving informed consent are 
the same (benefit for the group the research subjects represent, who are also the only 
possible choice of research subject). Subjects who are incompetent or incapable of giv-
ing informed consent are surely particularly vulnerable, and thus meet the definition 
of vulnerability set forward in Article 19 of the newest revision of the DoH. However, 
the DoH is concerned with all vulnerable groups and seeks “specifically considered 
protection.” 
The last revision of the DoH follows the negative trend in the number of groups 
explicitly labeled as vulnerable in previous revisions. In terms of a definition of vul-
nerability, it moves away from connecting vulnerability with informed consent. The 
rhetoric of the “disadvantaged” is omitted, while a new rhetoric referring to “wrongs” 
and “additional harms” is introduced. 
The CIOMS Guidelines. Since its first version, the CIOMS Guidelines have paid 
special attention to vulnerable individuals and groups. The 1982 CIOMS Proposed 
Guidelines define vulnerability in terms of the compromised consent or subordinate 
position of research subjects. CIOMS 1991 Guidelines for Epidemiological Research 
awarded vulnerability the status of a principle, i.e. vulnerability was included, together 
with the principle of autonomy, into the general principle of respect for persons. The 
1660 How Should We Treat the Vulnerable? 
same document is concerned with the rules of distributive justice when vulnerable 
subjects are included in research. The last mention of vulnerable subjects in the 1991 
CIOMS Guidelines for Epidemiological Research is in a section on the ethical review 
process. The title is “Vulnerable and dependent groups,” and the list of these groups 
recapitulates the one from the 1982 CIOMS Proposed Guidelines, as well as adding 
new groups. The 1993 CIOMS International Guidelines superseded the 1982 Proposed 
Guidelines, and this version was then superseded by the 2002 CIOMS International 
Guidelines. Vulnerability lost the status of a principle in the process, but it was given 
its own guideline, the scope of the concept was enlarged, and even more groups were 
identified as vulnerable.7 
The current version of the CIOMS Guidelines requires “special justification for 
inviting vulnerable individuals to serve as research subjects and, if they are selected, 
the means for protecting their rights and welfare must be strictly applied” (Guide-
line 13). Vulnerability is still mentioned under the principle of respect for persons, 
although as an “ethical consideration.” The following definition of vulnerable persons 
is provided: “Vulnerable persons are those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable 
of protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have insufficient power, 
intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their 
own interests” (Guideline 13). The 2002 CIOMS Guidelines expand the scope of the 
notion of vulnerability compared to the 1982 version. This version also adopts the 
approach of listing vulnerable groups. Socio- economic and educational insufficiencies 
are added to the causes of vulnerability, which results in an even more exhaustive list 
of vulnerable groups. 
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. The Declaration 
mentions respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity in a section entitled 
“Principles”: “In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and 
associated technologies, human vulnerability should be taken into account. Individuals 
and groups of special vulnerability should be protected and the personal integrity of 
such individuals respected” (Article 8). In the section “Promotion of the Declaration,” 
Article 24 additionally addresses vulnerability in the context of solidarity, arguing for 
“special regard for those rendered vulnerable by disease or disability or other personal, 
societal or environmental conditions and those with the most limited resources.” The 
Declaration thus seems to be sending five messages: (1) vulnerability is a principle; 
(2) it is related to personal integrity; (3) there are two levels of vulnerability (“human” 
and “special”); (4) those “especially vulnerable” should be protected; (5) sources of 
vulnerability can be internal (e.g. disease) or external (e.g. societal or environmental 
conditions). 
The Declaration itself has not been revised, instead relying on the publication of 
supplementary reports. The one that directly addresses the issue of vulnerability is The 
Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal Integrity Report of UNESCO’s 
International Bioethics Committee (IBC), published in 2013.16 The Report defines vul-
nerability as “a risk of a human being to be harmed in his or her physical and mental 
integrity” (Article 41). It further states that vulnerability is “an element of the human 
condition,” an “essential feature of human nature,” and “an inescapable dimension of 
the life of individuals” which “cannot be eradicated entirely.” The Report argues that 
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vulnerability beyond this kind of vulnerability constitutes “special vulnerability,” which 
means that “there are individuals and groups that are especially prone to violation of 
personal integrity or disrespect for autonomy due to exploitation, deception, coercion 
and disregarded through the application and advancing of scientific knowledge, medical 
practice and associated technologies” (Article 41). According to the Report, the deter-
minants of special vulnerability can be “natural,” social, political, and environmental, 
and a detailed list of examples is provided (Articles 12, 13, and 14). Reiterating that the 
UNESCO Declaration is addressed to a broad audience, the Report concludes that we 
all share responsibility in preventing every human being from having to find themselves 
in a position of special vulnerability (Article 44). 
Discussion
The results show that the common points among the documents examined regarding 
vulnerability are their references to “human vulnerability,” their interest in describing 
the characteristics of those who are (particularly) vulnerable, and their call for the 
special protection of such subjects. However, these documents do not reach a consen-
sus on any of these issues. The following shall address the key points and sources of 
disagreement regarding the conception of vulnerability: its dual nature (as an answer to 
the question of what vulnerability is), the problematic focus on classifying vulnerable 
subjects (offered as an answer to the question of who the vulnerable are), and the lack 
of guidance on how to protect the vulnerable. 
What is vulnerability? Generally speaking, there is a certain confusion when it 
comes to the very definition of vulnerability. Both ethics documents and research eth-
ics balance between two approaches we shall refer to here as “general” and “special.” 
Briefly described, the first describes vulnerability as an inherent characteristic of human 
embodiment that we should properly acknowledge instead of trying to eradicate. The 
human condition is the core of this approach, and it argues that everyone is vulner-
able by virtue of being human. The second approach focuses on a web of interpersonal 
relations and specific  context- dependent variables that cause certain individuals or 
groups to be vulnerable. It attempts to define those features and point to subjects who, 
by virtue of having been affected by vulnerability- inducing factors, are worthy of spe-
cial protection. We shall refer to this practice as the “classification methodology.” This 
section will examine where the documents examined position themselves in regard to 
tensions between these two definitions of vulnerability. 
The Belmont Report, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the UNESCO Declaration 
explicitly address the “particularly vulnerable,” therefore implying the existence of those 
who are “generally vulnerable”—that is to say, these documents acknowledge general 
vulnerability but focus on special vulnerability. However, on the level of the texts 
themselves, it remains unclear whether the “particularly” and “generally” vulnerable 
groups differ or partially overlap.
General vulnerability is most thoroughly elaborated upon in the IBC Report, which 
is a supplement to the UNESCO Declaration. The IBC report itself echoes the defini-
tion of vulnerability found in the European Commission’s Basic Ethical Principles in 
European Bioethics and Biolaw.23 The process of defining European principles resulted 
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in the Barcelona Declaration Policy Proposals to the European Commission (adopted 
in November 1998 by Partners in the BIOMED II Project). The principles of autonomy, 
dignity, integrity, and vulnerability are offered therein as a conceptual framework within 
which Europeans should debate issues of bioethics and biolaw (where the term biolaw 
refers to the legal side of biomedical issues). The Barcelona Declaration deals with 
twofold vulnerability: on one hand, vulnerability “expresses the finitude and fragility 
of life”, while on the other it is the “object of a moral principle requiring care for the 
vulnerable.”23[p.  243] Such a broad definition is supported with references to contem-
porary European philosophy (the authors specifically mention Ricœur, Levinas, and 
Habermas),23[p. 241] even though the definition of “vulnerability as conditio humana” has 
a much longer tradition in European thought.24,25 The Barcelona Declaration further 
states that the vulnerable are those under threat, and that all beings who have dignity 
are protected by the principle of vulnerability. Protection is understood here in both 
a negative and positive way: the principle requires not only non- interference with the 
autonomy, dignity, or integrity of beings, but also active assistance in the self- realization 
of their potential.23[p. 243] 
The general vulnerability approach is not without its difficulties. It deals with the 
fact of human mortality without actually addressing different forms and degrees to 
which harm is inflicted, life is damaged, and dignity is offended. In other words, this is 
a definition of vulnerability that does not deal with wounds, but with (human) beings’ 
general capacity to be wounded. Such a broad definition eliminates all degrees and forms 
of vulnerability as well as invulnerability. Some authors fear that the generalization 
and normalization of vulnerability turns it into a practically useless concept because 
it remains passive towards those who are worst off and need special protection.9,26,27 It 
has also been pointed out that there is a difference between those who are in danger 
of being harmed and those who have already been harmed, who have “fallen from 
the state of integrity to that of damaged individuality.”24[p.  284] This view argues for a 
distinction between vulnerability (an essential attribute of mankind) and susceptibility 
(a signifier of suffering). In effect, protection from vulnerability brings forth an ethical 
claim that requires justice and respect for universal human rights, while susceptibility 
impels different social actions of care for those who are already suffering and are at 
risk of additional harm.24,28
With regard to tension between the two definitions of vulnerability, the ethics docu-
ments examined here seem to acknowledge both, but define neither. The guidelines they 
offer only address the “particularly vulnerable,” who are described through examples. 
It is assumed these are special cases wherein subjects have found themselves in a state 
of insufficiency beyond that shared by all human beings. The documents thus suggest 
that they have adopted a dual definition of vulnerability. This is most clearly the case in 
the IBC report, while the CIOMS Guidelines presents a single exception when it argues 
that vulnerability is the result of a subject acquiring “vulnerability- defining attributes.” 
According to these guidelines, only when (and if) these attributes are present can a 
subject be considered vulnerable, i.e., worthy of special protection. Such exclusivity 
certainly offers user- friendly guidance when assessing cases potentially worthy of special 
protection. On the other hand, it recognizes only situations in which harm has already 
been done and in which measures protecting subjects from experiencing greater harm 
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must be employed. Just as the general vulnerability approach remains ignorant to those 
who have “fallen from the state of integrity”24[p. 284] and equates protection with preven-
tion, the special vulnerability approach, when viewed as a clear theoretical concept, 
equates protection with special protection. There are no degrees, modalities, or different 
levels and scopes of protection as it is considered necessary only when suffering has 
already taken place, and is not considered a remedy but a safeguard against additional 
harm. It is too much to ask of ethics documents in the field of (bio)medicine to address 
issues of human suffering in general or to discuss the topic of vulnerability as conditio 
humana. However, they should not let it out of their sight completely, just as address-
ing (for example) the question of patient autonomy does not eliminate considerations 
of the concept of autonomy as such.
Who are the vulnerable? The question of “who the vulnerable are” is a question 
of who is worthy of special protection: the general vulnerability approach emphasizes 
universal (human) vulnerability, thus ignoring cases of those who are “extraordinarily 
vulnerable”29,30 and with them the concern for special protection measures. All of the 
documents examined here mention vulnerable individuals (subjects, persons) and 
groups (populations), while the CIOMS Guidelines mention vulnerable communities 
and countries. This document most frequently refers to “vulnerable classes,” which is 
an expression that fits well with the classification methodology used in some of the 
documents. All of the documents seem to agree that an individual’s vulnerability is 
constituted of a certain lack of power. However, they do not reach a consensus on exactly 
what kind of insufficiency makes someone particularly vulnerable. The Belmont Report, 
the CIOMS Guidelines, and the IBC report on Article 8 of the UNESCO Declaration 
all adopt a classification methodology consisting of a list of those who are worthy of 
special protection. When these lists are combined and repetitions excluded, the fol-
lowing groups are considered vulnerable in at least one of these documents: persons 
with serious, potentially disabling, or life- threatening diseases; persons with mental 
disorders; persons with disabilities; the institutionalized (patients, residents of nurs-
ing homes, etc.); prisoners; children; pregnant and nursing women, women in general 
in some parts of the world; the elderly; medical and nursing students, subordinate 
hospital and laboratory personnel, employees of pharmaceutical companies, members 
of the armed forces or police; racial and ethnic minorities; the poor; the unemployed; 
the homeless; nomads; refugees; asylum seekers; victims of natural disasters; politically 
powerless people; the illiterate; the insufficiently educated; persons unfamiliar with 
modern medical concepts; future generations. 
It is apparent that, as the scope of the notion of vulnerability in documents broad-
ens (“insufficient power to protect one’s own interest,” “other personal, societal, or 
environmental conditions,” “limited resources”), the number of those who are consid-
ered particularly vulnerable increases. A consensus exists with regard to individuals 
incapable of free or informed consent, while lists of other vulnerable groups partially 
overlap between documents. A historical overview of transformations in criteria is 
hindered by the low number of documents, however it is apparent that the emphasis 
on incapability for informed consent has been lost over time, while the impact of 
“external” conditions has taken prominence. The oldest document (the Belmont Report, 
1979) limits vulnerable individuals and groups to those whose capacity for free or 
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informed consent is compromised or limited, and to those whose specific conditions 
expose them to manipulation. The definition of vulnerability presented in the newest 
document (the Declaration of Helsinki, 2013) is open enough to include individuals 
incapable of informed consent and those who might be under influence or duress and 
whose capacity for free informed consent is therefore compromised, as well as those 
considered disadvantaged by virtue of “external insufficiencies”7 and who are therefore 
at risk of being harmed or wronged. 
It is interesting to note that the background papers created to assist in the formu-
lation of the earliest document presented here, the Belmont Report, offer a detailed 
analysis of vulnerability that moves away from the  consent- based definition. All of the 
contributions on the topic were made by Robert Levine,31–33,7 who argues that “par-
ticular attention” is necessary in recruiting research subjects who might be “incapable 
of protecting their own rights and welfare.”33[pp. 4–32] Levine identifies three reasons for 
the lack of such power. An “uncomprehending” subject is classified incapable “largely 
by virtue of being unable to comprehend the information necessary to provide valid 
consent,”33[pp.  4–32] while a “dependent” subject is one in need of the assistance or 
direction of others, “connected in a subordinate relationship to another person or 
institution.”33[pp. 4–90] As was shown earlier, the Belmont Report considers these subjects 
vulnerable. However, Levine explicitly introduces the “vulnerable” as the third group 
of those incapable of protecting their own rights and welfare. He describes vulnerable 
subjects as “those who are either capable of being wounded or defenseless against 
injury,”33[pp. 4–85] (i.e., as “those who are the most susceptible to harm”31[pp. 2–52]). Levine’s 
elaborations on the topic of vulnerability show a significant overlap of the definitions 
of the uncomprehending, dependent, and vulnerable subjects31,32 that remains present 
in a majority of later authoritative documents concerned with the protection of the 
vulnerable in medical research. However, “being wounded” and “susceptible to harm” 
were to be almost completely omitted as descriptors of vulnerability in the ensuing 
three decades, at least in widely recognized ethics documents. They would appear again 
in the latest revision of the Declaration of Helsinki, not as additional descriptors, but, 
interestingly enough, as the only descriptors of vulnerability. 
To a certain degree, the classification methodology adopted in some of the docu-
ments can be justified on the grounds that they aim to provide guidelines in applying 
general ethical principles. On the other hand, critics have raised concerns that listing 
leads to labeling,26 which can result in the stereotyping, discrimination, stigmatization, 
and further exclusion of groups that are traditionally underrepresented in medical 
research.8,30,34–37 They argue that classification methodology (often referred to as the 
sub- population approach) exaggerates the protection of those who need it and forces 
protection upon those who might not need it. Simultaneously, such a methodology is 
blind to a variety of potential threats that an individual might face in a certain situa-
tion. Furthermore, the result of broadening the scope of the notion of vulnerability 
and using a methodology that assumes homogeneous classes of subjects is that anyone 
can be considered vulnerable, which is seen as problematic.4,8,38 This is a worrisome 
outcome for several reasons. If it were taken as an unexamined premise when designing 
a research study, hardly any research could take place. This is fostered by restrictive 
measures promoted by the documents themselves: research that includes vulnerable 
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groups is allowed only if it cannot be conducted among a non- vulnerable group. Spe-
cial protection of the particularly vulnerable does not necessarily mean they should be 
simply excluded from any research, but if the vast majority of subjects is considered 
vulnerable, special protection loses its meaning. Moreover, as the classification meth-
odology has to assume that there are some who will not meet the criteria, it will in 
effect never meld with the perspective that sees vulnerability as conditio humana. With 
obsolete special protection classification methodology can lead to an ethical vacuum. 
How should the vulnerable be protected? The general vulnerability approach 
claims that vulnerability is a feature of all (human) beings. Such a concept of vulner-
ability should not be considered of little practical value - on the contrary, it is claimed 
that it motivates our sympathetic openness to others, builds responsibility and global 
solidarity, provides grounds for global rights institutions, and, as some philosophers 
claim, is at the core of ethics.23,25,39–41 The UNESCO Declaration and its supplementary 
report on vulnerability are especially concerned with vulnerability interpreted in this 
way. Rather than talking exclusively about protection, they call for respect for human 
vulnerability. The rationale behind it is that, before arguing over whether vulnerability 
be eliminated or accepted, we must respect it.25 Respect for human vulnerability is 
explained by evoking the concept of personal integrity. The IBC report on Article 8 of 
the UNESCO Declaration states that there is an “integral relationship” between respect 
for human vulnerability and respect for the integrity of persons (Article 3).16[p. 9] This 
interpretation is reflected through interlinked references to vulnerability and personal 
integrity: for example, Article 41 of the IBC report defines vulnerability as “a risk of 
a human being to be harmed in his or her physical and mental integrity,”16[p. 37] while 
Article 6 states that the “human condition implies vulnerability” and that “every human 
being is exposed to the permanent risk of suffering ‘wounds’ to their physical and mental 
integrity.”16[p. 13] The principle of respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity 
thus obliges us to consideration an interpretation of vulnerability as “an inescapable 
dimension of the life of individuals and the shaping of human relationships” (Article 
6).16[p. 13] The message is that we must be aware of the fact that we all are vulnerable 
to being “touched” by others, i.e. permanently open to being “wounded.” Article 9 of 
the Report states that this interpretation of vulnerability calls on every human being 
“to fulfill the fundamental obligations we have one to another.”6[p. 13] Thus, according 
to this approach, respect for vulnerability entails responsibility. Moreover, the Report 
expresses hope that “acknowledging the reality of vulnerability might provide a bridge 
between the moral ‘strangers’ of a pluralistic society, thereby enhancing the value of 
solidarity rather than mere individual interests” (Article 9).6[p. 13] 
As mentioned earlier, although they accept the concept of general vulnerability, 
both the UNESCO Declaration and its supplementary report do not ignore cases of 
individuals and groups who are “vulnerable in ways over and above that which the 
human condition necessarily involves.”16[p. 15] What guidance do they provide on how 
to treat these individuals and groups? Article 8 of the UNESCO Declaration provides 
only general instructions—“individuals and groups of special vulnerability should 
be protected”—adding that “the personal integrity of such individuals [should be] 
respected.” It can be noticed that this formulation clearly links respect for personal 
integrity exclusively to “individuals and groups of special vulnerability,” thus distort-
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ing the “integral relationship” between vulnerability and integrity promoted in the 
supplementary report. Responding to this apparent inconsistency, Patrão Neves argues 
that giving priority to those “classified as vulnerable” serves as a safeguard measure 
against reducing the vulnerable to their vulnerabilities (for example, against reducing 
the patient to his or her illness). Thus, the principle of respect for human vulnerability 
and personal integrity calls for the protection of the vulnerable against their being 
“wounded,” as well as for respect for their integrity, which is interpreted as the “totality 
or oneness that each person comprises.”5[p. 161] Although several examples are provided to 
illustrate how this broadly constructed principle might guide practitioners in different 
types of medical practice,5[pp. 162–163] the actual normative force of the principle remains 
unclear, as do the ways and forms of protective measures aimed at those subjects the 
principle intends to serve. 
One would expect that those documents primarily considering cases of “special 
vulnerability” offer clearer guidance on special protection. However, this is not the 
case. The protection of the vulnerable is concerned with those who should be pro-
tected, however, not only is there no word on measures of special protection, but 
the nature of the danger also remains unclear. The overall silence of the documents 
on measures of special protection might suggest that the question itself is misplaced. 
Perhaps a better question might be: What exactly should vulnerable subjects be pro-
tected against? According to examined documents, vulnerability is revealed through a 
certain relationship—“being dependent” (the Belmont Report), “easy to manipulate” 
(the Belmont Report), “incapable of protecting own interests” (CIOMS Guidelines), 
“increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring additional harm” (the Declaration 
of Helsinki)—all of these constructions can function only with an offensive player on 
the other end. It suggests that the nature of vulnerability cannot be properly addressed 
without taking the nature of the danger into account—a fact explicitly mentioned only 
in the Belmont Report. It was only in the latest revision of the Declaration of Helsinki, 
the newest document examined here, that a similar perspective was suggested.11[p. 51] The 
newest revision of the Declaration of Helsinki seems to be following the path already 
laid down in the literature on focusing on harms and wrongs, thus shifting attention 
towards specific circumstances rather than towards the characteristics of subjects.3[p. 19
6],8[p. 44],26,42  This shift from the “protection of ” (the vulnerable) to “protection against” 
(harms and wrongs) respects the fact that vulnerabilities reveal themselves in relation 
to something and in a specific context. Such an approach to the special protection issue 
emphasizes the need for tailored instead of generic protection, where the latter often 
results in the exclusion of those whom research labels vulnerable.43[p.  130] In fact, the 
main purpose of special protection in this setting is to safeguard vulnerable subjects 
within the research process (in all its phases and aspects) against possible harm, not 
against their very participation in research. It is true that many subjects are vulner-
able, but they are not identically vulnerable,3[p. 196] and therefore should not be treated 
in a uniform way. Literature offers a variety of possible approaches on how to identify 
“special need” and provide “tailored” special protection: for example, one approach 
offers a list of markers for the occurrence of identifiable harm within the research 
context;42 an “analytical approach” aims to identify the morally relevant features of 
vulnerability and determine supplementary measures required to address these vulner-
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abilities,44,45 while a “diagnostic approach” requires the identification of that morally 
protected interest that is at risk in a given research or health care setting, the reasons 
for its being so, and those involved in the duty of protection.43 None of these proposals 
denies that some features can make a subject vulnerable in almost every context (as is 
the case, for example, with children). They are also in agreement over the fact that one 
feature might render a subject vulnerable in one context, but not in the other, and that 
subjects must be protected in a particular setting which reveals (or even produces)30 
their vulnerabilities. The main intention of these (and several other) approaches is to 
offer guidance on how to substitute generic protection with tailored protection, which 
is determined by influences on the subject (potential harms and wrongs) and not by 
the characteristics of the subjects themselves (e.g., poor, undereducated, members 
of minorities). Further, the conceptual shift from the “protection of ” to “protection 
against” places the normative force of the claim to special protection in wrongs and 
harms, which seems far less problematic than connecting it with vulnerability itself. 
Naturally, there are still a number of unresolved issues, one of them being the relation-
ship of special vulnerability to general vulnerability, as both types of vulnerability are, 
after all, located in the same subject. The interpretation of vulnerability offered in the 
Declaration of Helsinki seems to provide a good starting point for further discussions 
on the nature, scope, contents, and practical implications of vulnerability. 
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to determine what authoritative ethics documents in the 
field of (bio)medicine have to say on three questions: what is vulnerability, who are 
the vulnerable, and how should they be protected. We must conclude that none of 
these documents provides a clear answer to any of these questions. A clear definition 
of vulnerability is nowhere to be found, but this would be too much to ask of this type 
of document in any case. However, what one might expect is a particular framework 
within which the important concept of vulnerability would be situated. The documents 
do offer such a framework, although it must be reconstructed by reading carefully 
and decoding their common features from examples of “those who are vulnerable.” 
The general vulnerability claim that everyone is vulnerable by virtue of being human 
faces problems in research and health care applications. The classification methodol-
ogy employed by other approaches to shed light on the characteristics that separate 
vulnerable individuals from invulnerable ones has also proven weak and significantly 
flawed. Moreover, the documents that use this methodology do not provide guidance 
on the next step: how to protect the vulnerable. Generally speaking, it remains unclear 
what is meant by “special protection.”
Attempts to describe vulnerability by identifying examples of vulnerable classes 
who should then be treated in an unspecified “special way” place a heavy burden on 
the members of ethics committees, who must assess whether proposed research meets 
ethical standards of conduct. As much as some groups are wrongly predetermined to be 
vulnerable through the possession of a certain vulnerability- defining attribute, members 
of ethics committees are implicitly characterized as ultimately rational humans who 
can clearly recognize markers of vulnerabilities not offered on lists and who can judge 
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whether the proposed safeguard measures correspond with ethical concern for special 
protection. The shift from the “protection of ” to “protection against”, as suggested in the 
latest version of the DoH, is a conceptual change that might help us better understand 
vulnerability by moving away from it. 
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